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Abstract
We shed light on the impact of institutional quality and information barriers on trade in
financial services using a novel panel data set on revenue earned on domestic and cross-
border equity securities underwriting transactions. Our data set covers 91,511 transactions
across 122 countries of origin and 145 countries of destination for the period 2000-2015.
The granularity of our data set enables us to estimate theory-consistent gravity equations,
avoiding the methodological caveats that apply to most of the existing literature on gravity
in international finance. First, we find that institutional quality in the exporting country,
proxied by the rule of law, is an important determinant of financial services trade. In
addition, we provide support for the “bonding hypothesis” (Coffee, 1999) in the literature
on the determinants of foreign listings. Foreign firms can increase their valuation by
bonding themselves to high-quality institutions through cross-listing. In line with this
hypothesis, we find that institutional quality matters primarily for transactions where
the underwriter is located in the country of the stock exchange where the shares are
listed. Second, we focus on the role of multinational business networks in breaking down
information frictions. Specifically, we control for several measures of “connectivity” based
on banks’ parent-subsidiary networks and syndication ties across banks. We find evidence
supporting our hypothesis. In all our estimations, we control for the classical determinants
of trade in the gravity framework, including distance. Interestingly, we find that the
inclusion of our institutional and informational variables leaves a very limited role for
physical distance - supporting the consensus in the literature on gravity in international
finance that the role of distance reflects institutional and information frictions.
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1 Introduction
The gravity model is undoubtedly one of the workhorses of empirical work in international goods trade.
Over the last two decades, it has increased in popularity in international finance where it has been
used to explain international transactions and holdings in financial assets, such as portfolio equity and
debt securities. A stable finding of this literature is that distance has a negative effect on trade in
financial assets. The magnitude of the elasticity is similar to that found in the goods trade literature.
This is surprising since there are no transportation costs involved. The consensus is that distance is
a proxy for informational and institutional frictions, and there is evidence pointing in this direction.
Our paper contributes to the literature on gravity in international finance both methodologically and
conceptually. The literature suffers from several shortcomings, mainly regarding data availability and
quality, econometric estimation, and the extent to which empirical specifications are theory consistent.
Our paper addresses some of these shortcomings by applying theory-consistent methods to a novel
panel data set on fees from domestic and cross-border equity securities underwriting services. The
granularity of our data set is key to our conceptual and methodological contributions. We build a
data set of cross-border and domestic trade flows by aggregating transaction-level data on revenue
flows associated with the underwriting of new issues of equity securities from the Dealogic Equity
Capital Market (ECM) database. Our data set covers 91,511 transactions from 7,326 underwriters
serving 46,408 equity issuers across 122 countries of origin and 145 countries of destination for the
period 2000-2015. This data set not only allows us to estimate theory-consistent gravity equations, it
also allows us to examine the role of information barriers through the lens of multinational business
networks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first contribution of this kind in the literature
on gravity in international finance. Specifically, we build several measures of “connectivity” based on
banks’ parent-subsidiary networks and syndication ties across banks. Multinational business networks
matter for trade in financial services as they help trading partners break down information frictions.
We find evidence supporting this hypothesis. In all our estimations, we control for the classical deter-
minants of trade in the gravity framework, including distance. Interestingly, we find that the inclusion
of our institutional and informational variables leaves a very limited role for physical distance - sup-
porting the consensus in the literature on gravity in international finance that the role of distance
reflects institutional and information frictions.
We start by highlighting how our paper addresses several of the methodological shortcomings of the
existing literature. The gravity model posits that trade between countries increases in their combined
economic mass, and decreases in the geographical distance and trade barriers between them. The
gravity framework was initially developed for trade in goods, but it can be applied equally to services.
Since the mid-2000s economists have also applied gravity to the realm of international finance. The
interest in gravity was sparked by the finding that gravity equations explain international transactions
in financial assets at least as well as goods trade transactions (Portes et al., 2001; Portes and Rey,
2005). Since then a large number of papers have estimated gravity equations for cross-border equity,
bond and bank holdings. The two main sources of data on financial holdings used in the gravity litera-
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ture are the IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey and the BIS Locational Banking Statistics.1
Despite its popularity, the gravity framework in international finance suffers from several caveats and
shortcomings, which we attempt to address both through the very nature of our data set and through
our methods.
The main shortcoming affecting the existing literature is that most estimated gravity equations in
international finance do not have a theoretical foundation (Okawa and van Wincoop, 2012). The first,
and most obvious, violation of theory is the omission of the appropriate source and destination country
fixed effects that capture multilateral resistance (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). Fixed effects are
sometimes explicitly omitted because the authors aim to explore the impact of variables that would
be absorbed by those fixed effects. Our novel panel data set enables us to include importer-year and
exporter-year fixed effects, and at the same time study the impact of information barriers that are
not necessarily dyadic, but rather vary at the country-year level. Our identification strategy relies on
the fact that we observe both domestic and cross-border transactions. Specifically, we multiply our
explanatory variables by a dummy variable for international trade.
The second violation of theory in the existing literature comes from the inclusion of explanatory
variables without theoretical foundation. This violation has to do with the fact that the gravity liter-
ature in international finance has looked at international financial flows through the lens of data on
financial holdings, rather than data on trade in financial services. According to the theory of optimal
portfolio choice the demand for an asset depends not only on its expected return, but also on the
latter’s covariance with other assets. As a consequence, researchers often include correlations (mainly
across asset returns) as explanatory variables in their gravity equations.2 However, as highlighted by
Okawa and van Wincoop (2012), this is not theory consistent. Paralleling Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003) in the goods trade literature, Okawa and van Wincoop (2012) discuss the two key assumptions
that must be satisfied to generate a gravity specification for asset holdings. The first condition is
that decisions about the overall demand for assets are separable from the portfolio allocation across
assets. This condition holds in many models. The second condition is that asset demand depends on
a relative price. This assumption is problematic for gravity in finance because it is not in line with
the predictions of the theory of optimal portfolio choice. Our paper is not subject to these caveats
because we use data on the value of financial services, rather than financial holdings. Specifically, we
use data on revenues (fees) earned from the provision of underwriting services by securities underwrit-
1Papers that examine cross-border bank holdings using the BIS Locational Banking Statistics include among
others Papaioannou (2009), Brei and von Peter (2017), Daude and Fratzscher (2008), and Houston, Lin and Ma
(2012). Papers that examine equity holdings using the IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS)
include among others Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008), Daude and Fratzscher (2008), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2005), Veronique and Benassy-Quere (2006), Faruqee et al. (2004), Coeurdacier and Martin (2009), Coeurdacier
and Guibaud (2011), and Berkel (2007). The literature that relies on other data sets is dominated by papers
focusing primarily on a single country, with most attention paid to the United States; e.g. Portes et al. (2001),
Ahearne et al. (2004), Forbes (2010), and Chiţu et al. (2014).
2See among others Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008), Forbes (2010), Faruqee et al. (2004), Coeurdacier and
Guibaud (2011), Berkel (2007), and Chan et al. (2005).
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ers to issuers. We do not model the demand for assets, but rather the demand for services provided
by financial services firms. This is not only methodologically appealing, it also enables us to assess
the impact of specific variables directly on revenue flows from international trade, rather than holdings.
Contributions using data on trade in financial services are surprisingly scarce. However, this scarcity
is no longer surprising once one considers the severe limitations of data on financial services. Data
sets on trade in services, including financial services, are compiled on the basis of balance of pay-
ments data provided by national statistics offices. There are many challenges to overcome in order to
develop a global database of coherent bilateral trade in services statistics. These challenges include
missing data, trade asymmetries (where the reported exports of country j to country k do not align
with the reported imports of country k from country j), and differences in reporting standards and
statistical methodologies. These challenges are particularly acute when trying to compile a database
at a disaggregated level to look at certain categories of services in isolation, e.g. financial services.
Recent efforts by the OECD and the WTO have lead to the creation of the OECD-WTO Balanced
Trade in Services (BaTIS) dataset. It provides annual bilateral data on trade in services covering 191
economies and broken down by services categories, including a broad “financial services” category.3
The primary official data is subjected to multiple cleaning, mirroring, and estimation procedures to
produce an internationally coherent data set. While this is a welcome development, our data set
presents numerous advantages over data sets that are based on balance of payments statistics. Our
data set has a comprehensive global coverage (zero observations are true zeros with a very high prob-
ability) and does not require any manipulations designed to harmonize the data across countries, to
mirror exports and imports, and to predict missing trade flows among countries. In particular, using
“synthetic” observations obtained through mirroring and prediction techniques might be problematic
in regressions that study the determinants of bilateral trade because there is a danger that a similar
gravity model was used to fill in the missing cells in the trade matrix. In addition, the amount of mod-
eling contained in the data will vary across country groups. The data set might be heavy on modeling
for emerging markets for example, particularly when applying sectoral disaggregation. Finally, our
data set is at the transaction level and contains data on both domestic and cross-border transactions.
This fine level of disaggregation enables us to be flexible with how we aggregate trade flows and make
use of them in the empirical strategy. In particular, having data on both domestic and cross-border
transactions enables us to identify coefficients on country-time specific variables despite the inclusion
of country-time fixed effects. The granularity of our data set also enables us to build connectivity
measures based on banks’ parent-subsidiary networks and syndication ties across banks.
The remaining shortcomings in the existing literature are related to estimation issues. Beyond the fail-
ure to include the appropriate fixed effects, the main methodological problem is that the overwhelming
majority of contributions, even relatively recent ones, use log-linearized forms of the gravity equation.
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) explain that this is a problem because under heteroskedasticity, the
parameters of log-linearized models estimated by OLS lead to biased estimates of the true elasticities.
3A recent contribution using this database is Nord̊as and Rouzet (2017).
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We follow the authors’ proposed solution and use Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) to
estimate the gravity equations in their multiplicative form.
We now turn to a summary of our main findings. First, we examine the role of institutional quality
in the exporting country, proxied by the exporter’s rank on the Rule of Law index proposed by Kauf-
mann et al. (2011). Rule of Law captures institutions that are vital for the financial services industry,
such as the legal environment. In support of this hypothesis, we find that moving down one rank
(indicating a deterioration in institutional quality) is associated with a decrease in international trade
relative to domestic trade by 62.2%. These results are in line with the economic geography litera-
ture. For example, Wójcik et al. (2018b) find that international financial centers (IFCs) emerge from
well-developed cities in countries with strong Rule of Law and cost efficient enforcement of contracts.
Among the traditional gravity control variables, a shared colonial history appears to be particularly
important. Being a previous colonial partner increases international trade relative to domestic trade
by 195.9%. This coefficient is higher than magnitudes previously found in the goods trade literature.
The apparent importance of a shared colonial history is intuitive. Countries that have been in a
colonial relationship are more likely to share common institutional and legal frameworks, which are
paramount for trade in financial services.
In addition, we provide support for the “bonding hypothesis” (Coffee, 1999) in the literature on
the determinants of foreign listings. Foreign firms can increase their valuation by bonding themselves
to high-quality institutions through cross-listing (Doidge et al., 2004). Cross-listing firms subject
themselves to stricter standards of regulation, disclosure, and enforcement to signal their commitment
to respecting the rights of shareholders (Doidge, 2004; Doidge et al., 2007, 2009). The added pro-
tection and the reputational effects (Siegel, 2005) make investors more willing to buy the shares of
foreign firms that “tie their hands” in this manner. In order to examine this hypothesis, we exploit
differences in the sensitivity of certain transaction types to the institutional environment. Our strat-
egy relies on the fact that equity underwriting services are provided by syndicates of underwriters,
not all of which will be geographically located in the country of the stock exchange where the shares
are listed. Underwriters located in the country of the stock exchange typically help with the listing
itself. By contrast, underwriters located in other countries are typically used to help sell shares in
the offering to local institutional investors (Pollock et al., 2004). The “bonding hypothesis” suggests
that institutional quality should matter more when the trade flow pertains to listing, i.e. is between
an issuer and an underwriter located in the country of the stock exchange where the shares are issued
(Doidge, 2004; Doidge et al., 2007). We find evidence supporting this conjecture. Specifically, we find
that institutional quality matters primarily for transactions where the underwriter is located in the
country of the stock exchange where the shares are listed. This points to a significant role played by
institutional quality in determining where firms choose to list their shares.
Second, we focus on the role of multinational business networks. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first study of this type in the literature on gravity in international finance. Multinational
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business networks matter for trade in financial services as they help trading partners break down
information frictions. The economic geography literature proposes that trade frictions, such as infor-
mation frictions, may be reduced through the strategic business activities of multinational companies
in finance, accounting, law and management consulting, which operate networks of offices or sub-
sidiaries across multiple countries (Taylor and Derudder, 2016). The expectation is that the more a
country-dyad is connected through the subsidiary networks of multinational companies, the lower the
information frictions will be between the two countries, ceteris paribus. To examine this hypothesis,
we build several measures of network connectivity based on banks’ parent-subsidiary networks and
syndication ties across trading partners. First, we construct a measure of ownership ties, based on the
number of underwriters for each country-dyad that have subsidiaries in both countries. We find that
connectivity has a significantly positive impact on international trade. Specifically, a one percentage
point increase in ownership ties is associated with a 10.8% increase in international trade relative to
domestic trade. Second, we build two alternative measures of multinational connectivity based on ties
formed by co-membership of underwriting syndicates (Pažitka et al., 2019) using data on issues of
equity securities with more than one underwriter (representing 42.7% of all deals).4 First, we define
syndication ties count as the number of ties formed by the co-membership of underwriting syndicates
among underwriter parents headquartered in the exporting country with those headquartered in the
importing country in a given year. Second, we construct unique syndication ties count for exporter-
importer-year observation by counting the number of unique syndication partners that underwriters in
the exporting country have in the importing country in every year. This means that each underwriter
in the importing country is counted only once, even if multiple underwriters in the exporting country
had co-syndicated with that underwriter. Finally, we transform the syndication ties count (unique
syndication ties count) into percentages by normalizing them by the sum of syndication ties (unique
syndication ties) for each exporter-year. We find that a one percentage point increase in syndication
ties (unique syndication ties) is associated with a 6.5% (9.4%) increase in international trade relative
to domestic trade. Interestingly, we find that after accounting for ownership or syndication ties, the
impact of Rule of Law and a shared colonial history decreases in magnitude. This could indicate
that (physical or relational) networks might help overcome issues associated with weaker, or different,
institutional frameworks.
In all our estimations, we control for the classical determinants of trade in the gravity framework,
including distance. A stable finding of the literature on gravity in international finance is that dis-
tance has a negative effect on trade in financial assets. The magnitude of the elasticity is similar to
that found in the goods trade literature. This is surprising since there are no transportation costs
involved. The consensus is that distance is a proxy for informational and institutional frictions, and
there is evidence pointing in this direction. Interestingly, we find a very limited role for physical
distance. We find that the latter only matters at the extensive margin of trade. Specifically, a 10%
increase in bilateral distance translates into a 4.58% decrease in the probability of international trade
relative to domestic trade when we control for Rule of Law. The elasticity decreases further when we
4The construction of these measures is described in detail in Section 3.4.
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also control for syndication ties. This result is in sharp contrast with the previous literature on gravity
in international finance, where many authors find elasticities commensurate with those in the goods
trade literature. Our finding is driven both by our methods and the inclusion of relevant institutional
and informational variables. First, we estimate theory-consistent gravity equations unlike most of the
previous literature on gravity in international finance. Because we have data on both international
and domestic transactions, and multiply distance by a dummy for international trade, our distance
elasticity is to be interpreted as the impact of distance on international trade relative to domestic
trade. Second, to illustrate the power of our explanatory variables, we estimate a classical gravity
equation without the latter and indeed find much larger distance elasticities, which are significant
along both the intensive and extensive margins of trade.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the gravity model and our
empirical strategy. Section 3 presents our data sources and descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents
the estimation of our theory-consistent gravity equations, focusing on the role of institutional factors
and information barriers. Section 5 concludes.
2 Structural gravity and empirical methodology
2.1 Theoretical structural gravity
One of the most attractive features of the gravity model of trade is that it can be theoretically de-
rived from a large class of models. For example, Arkolakis et al. (2012) show that a large number
of micro foundations generate isomorphic gravity equations. For the majority of the empirical results
presented in this paper we can remain agnostic as to the exact underlying theoretical model, and thus
the assumptions we need to make. However, for expositional reasons, we briefly formalize the gravity
model using the influential supply side model presented in Eaton and Kortum (2002). Here we closely
follow Yotov et al. (2016).
Issuer (consumer) preferences are assumed to be geographically invariant and can be described by








. j denotes country, i indexes varieties and σ is the constant elasticity of
substitution between varieties. We assume constant returns to scale at the underwriter (firm) level.
Countries, however, are heterogeneous in their technology. Specifically country j has efficiency in
producing variety i given by zj(i). The key assumption in Eaton and Kortum (2002) is that z is




, where Ti is country specific
and shifts the distribution, whereas θ determines the variation in the distribution.
Given constant returns to scale, and denoting the input costs in country j with cj , we have that the cost
of producing a unit of variety i in country j is given by
cj
zj(i)
. Assuming the usual iceberg trade costs
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Assuming perfect competition this is also the price issuers (consumers) in k would pay for variety i
from country j if they decided to purchase it. However, issuers (consumers) in k may not actually





where L is the set of possible locations. Using Equation (1) and properties of the type-two extreme
value distribution, we can determine the distribution of prices from which country k actually buys
services.
Gk(p) = P [pk ≤ p] = 1−
∏
j∈L


















−θ. Thus the fraction of services
that country k buys from country j is given by πjk = Tj (cjtjk)
−θ /Φk. As average expenditure per
service is geographically invariant (from invariance of consumer utility), k’s fraction of expenditure on
services from j is given by Xjk = πjkEk, where Ek is k’s total expenditure. Finally, we note that the
value of revenue (output) in country j, Yj , is simply equal to total expenditure on j’s variety across
the world (including in j itself), that is Yj =
∑
k∈LXjk. Using this equation and those derived above




5, we can derive the following










Defining Πk and Pk appropriately
6, the resulting structural gravity equation explains trade flows









If we alternatively constructed the model from the demand side, as shown in Yotov et al. (2016),
we would arrive at an isomorphic equation with 1 − σ = −θ where σ is the elasticity of substitution
between varieties. Yk is nominal income in country k and Y is nominal world income. Ek is total
expenditure in destination k. Πj and Pk are the multilateral resistance terms, capturing j’s outward
resistance or ease of market access, and k’s inward resistance or ease of market access, respectively.
Finally, tjk captures the bilateral trade costs between j and k.
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5γ = [Γ ((θ + 1− σ) /θ)]
1
(1−σ) where Γ is the Gamma function.



























7Equation (4) describes aggregate trade flows between countries. However, we are interested in explaining
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2.2 Empirical implementation of the gravity equation
The empirical estimation of Equation (4) is subject to numerous issues that have lead to many the-
oretically and statistically inconsistent estimates of key parameters in the past. Some of these issues
have been satisfactorily dealt with only recently, with important theoretical, econometric and com-
putational advances. Contributions such as Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006), and Piermartini and Yotov (2016) among others have insured that the quality of
empirical gravity research continues to increase. However, a surprising number of contributions in
international finance still fail to heed their advice. In this section, we describe the main challenges in-
volved in estimating Equation (4) and how we overcome each obstacle in our specific empirical setting.
First, trade data, especially when disaggregated by sector, suffers from the many-zeros problem.
Many countries have no trade with many other countries in many time periods. Therefore, the full
trade matrix is a sparse matrix containing many zero entries. This is a serious problem, when using
the traditional log-linearized version of the gravity equation estimated with OLS. Indeed, zeros are
dropped as if they were missing values, despite the fact that they contain useful information about
trade patterns. First-generation solutions to this problem, such as adding a small positive number
to each zero, are arbitrary and lead to biased results (Head and Mayer, 2014). Therefore, we follow
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and estimate our gravity equation using Poisson pseudo maximum
likelihood (PPML)8, which allows us to estimate Equation (4) directly in a multiplicative form and
thus retain the zeros. This method has been shown to have excellent properties, even when the pro-
portion of zeros is very high. In addition, log-linearized models are biased (and inconsistent) in the
presence of sufficient heteroskedasticity (as is the norm with trade data) due to the simple fact, that
Jensen’s inequality implies ln(E[y]) 6= E[ln(y)]. Using PPML also enables us to overcome this problem
as described in Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006).
Second, Equation (4) contains various unobserved components. In particular, the objects Πj and
Pk, termed “multilateral resistances” by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), are unobserved. Baldwin
and Taglioni (2006) show the importance of sufficiently accounting for these terms in order to achieve
consistent estimation of the parameters in a gravity model. We overcome this issue by leveraging the
panel nature of our data set and including exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects, πjt and pkt,
in all our empirical specifications. Note that including these fixed effects also absorbs the country and
world nominal income terms as well as the destination expenditure variable, as they cannot be sep-
arately identified. In addition to the multilateral resistance terms being unobserved, bilateral trade
costs given by tjkt are also unobserved. We proxy for this unobserved variable using a number of
trade flows of a specific industry. Fortunately, the gravity model is separable, and therefore Equation (4) holds
for any specific industry l, noting that every variable (including σ or θ ) is then l specific.
8PPML is a weighted non-linear least squares estimator where the weights are constructed under the as-
sumption that E[y|x] ∝ V[y|x]. This captures the well-known property of trade data that higher means are
associated with higher variances. This assumption leads to equal weighting and Poisson distributed errors. In










observed variables traditionally used in empirical gravity equations, namely the geographical distance
between the exporting country (country of the underwriter) and the importing country (country of
the issuer), whether the exporter and importer share a border, whether the exporter and importer
share a language, and whether the exporter and importer have a common colonial history. We aug-
ment the set of explanatory variables with a measure of institutional quality in the exporting country
(Rule of Law) and three dyadic measures of connectivity based on ownership and syndication ties. We
also control for the level of development in the exporting country (GDP per capita) as this is likely to
be highly correlated with institutional quality. A detailed description of variables is given in Section 3.
Third, a potential problem with including exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects to deal with
the multilateral resistance terms is that we can no longer estimate the effect of certain variables.
Importantly, this prevents us from exploring the role of information barriers and institutional factors
when the variables proxying them are country-time specific (such as the rule of law in the exporting
country). Not including the fixed effects is not an option as this would render our estimates statis-
tically and theoretically inconsistent. In order to retain the theoretically and empirically necessary
importer-time and exporter-time fixed effects, and simultaneously identify the impact of country-time
specific variables of interest, we use an approach suggested by Heid et al. (2017). Specifically, we rely
on the fact that our data set contains both domestic (intranational) and cross-border (international)
trade flows. We multiply all the explanatory variables with a dummy for international trade, INTjk,
which takes the value one whenever j 6= k.9 The resulting coefficients should therefore be interpreted
as capturing the impact of the variables on international trade relative to domestic trade.
Taking all the above into consideration, our baseline empirically tractable version of Equation (4)
is given by the following equation:
Xjkt = exp {πjt + pkt + ZjktΓ}+ εjkt (5)
where πjt are exporter-time fixed effects and pkt are importer-time fixed effects. Zjkt represents the
control variables of interest, and εjkt is an idiosyncratic error term.
3 Data sources and descriptive statistics
3.1 Trade flows in equity underwriting services
Our source of data on trade flows is Dealogic’s Equity Capital Market (ECM) database. Our de-
pendent variable is a measure of trade flows based on revenues earned by banks from underwriting
9Without data on intranational trade, we would only be able to include importer-time fixed effects given that
we are interested in variables that are exporter-time specific (Rule of Law for example). Earlier papers using
panel data sets suffered from that shortcoming. For example, Papaioannou (2009) uses BIS panel data on cross-
border bank holdings. Because the author is interested in the effect of time-varying institutional characteristics
in the recipient country, they can only include time-specific fixed effects for the source country.
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equity securities for their clients (issuers). Revenues are reported in current USD (nominal). Our
data set covers 91,511 issues of equity securities offerings during the 2000-2015 period. These can
be divided into 23,136 initial public offerings (IPOs), 58,454 follow-on offerings, and 9,921 convert-
ible debt securities. We identify the key parties for each transaction – the underwriter(s) and the
issuer. An offering can be underwritten by a single underwriter or a group of underwriters, so called
underwriting syndicates (Pollock et al., 2004). These are groups of underwriters organized for the
purpose of bringing a single issue of equity securities to the market and dissolved thereafter. Every
offering has as many revenue flows as there are underwriters involved. The 91,511 offerings in our data
set constitute 306,512 revenue flows among underwriters and their clients. 57.3% of the offerings in
our data set are underwritten by a single underwriter. The remaining transactions are underwritten
by underwriting syndicates. When more than one underwriter is involved in an offering, revenue is
apportioned by Dealogic’s proprietary apportioning model among underwriting syndicate members.
This is done based on their role in the underwriting syndicate (bookrunner, lead manager, co-manager,
underwriter) and their level of participation in the deal, given by the fraction of newly issued securities
allocated to them for selling to primary market investors.
In order to aggregate these individual revenue flows to a country-dyadic level, we need to identify
the country of the underwriter(s) (exporting country/countries) and the country of the issuer (im-
porting country) for each transaction. We adopt two conventions. First, the country of both the
underwriter and the issuer is assigned based on their respective headquarters of operations, i.e. where
their de-facto head office is located, rather than where each company is registered for tax or legal
purposes.10 Second, if the underwriter directly involved in a transaction is a subsidiary company, the
exporting country is determined by the nationality of its parent company - in line with international
trade statistics conventions. We link the 91,511 offerings in our data set to 46,408 clients and 7,326
underwriter subsidiaries, controlled by 4,287 parent companies.
Dealogic’s ECM database contains information on the country of headquarters of operations for all the
46,408 issuers in our data set. The ECM database, however, does not include data on the location of
underwriters. To fill this gap, we hand-collect data on addresses of headquarters of operations of un-
derwriters’ parent companies from corporate websites and databases, including Bureau van Dijk Orbis,
Nexis UK and Bloomberg. We were able to collect data on countries of HQ of operations for 4,176 par-
ent companies (97.4%) in our data set. Data on revenue earned from underwriting equity securities in
Dealogic’s ECM database is either directly reported by underwriters or is estimated by Dealogic. Rev-
enue data is directly disclosed for 45.1% of transactions by the underwriters involved in them. Revenue
data is not disclosed by the underwriters for the remaining 54.9% of transactions. However, Dealogic’s
ECM database offers proprietary estimates of revenue earned for 47.7% of transactions. We therefore
have a combination of disclosed and estimated fees available for 92.8% of transactions. Finally, 7.2%
10The reason behind this is to avoid any biases caused by companies registered or formally headquartered
outside of the countries of their operations. For example, it is very popular for Chinese companies to register
in the British Virgin Islands.
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of transactions do not have disclosed or estimated revenue data available, and are therefore omitted
from our sample. The missing geographical and revenue data means that we cannot observe 7,710
out of the 306,512 revenue flows (2.52%) in our data set. In terms of the pattern of missing data, we
were less likely to find geographical data for very small and no longer operating underwriters with no
traceable online footprint. We would however not expect this to affect specific countries disproportion-
ately. To create our aggregated country-dyadic trade flows, we combine data reported by underwriters
with Dealogic’s estimates for those transactions where hard data is not available. This is preferable
to omitting transactions for which hard data on revenue earned is not available. While the use of
estimates for a fraction of transactions may be a source of random measurement error, the exclusion
of transactions for which hard data is not available is likely to bias our results against countries that
do not require underwriters to disclose revenue earned from equity underwriting for individual deals.11
After aggregating individual revenue flows into country-dyadic flows, we merge the latter with the
CEPII distance data set. The country of origin is the country of the underwriter (exporting country),
and the country of destination is the country of the issuer (importing country). Our country-dyadic
flows derived from Dealogic data cover 122 countries of origin and 145 countries of destination. We
replace any unmatched observations in the trade matrix with zeros. This is justified by the compre-
hensive nature of Dealogic’s Equity Capital Markets database, which allows us to treat unobserved
trade flows as true zeros with a very high level of confidence. Naturally, it cannot be ruled out that
some of the zero trade flows in our data set may be the consequence of missing data, but we estimate
that the proportion of “false zeros” is likely to be very small. All the missing data combined represent
7,710 revenue flows among underwriters and clients, which we are either unable to pinpoint geograph-
ically or for which do not have data on revenue earned. We would expect that the vast majority of
these missing revenue flows will be associated with country-dyads that have non-zero trade flows and
only a small fraction of the 7,710 missing revenue flows is likely to fall on country-dyads for which
we report zero trade flows. Therefore, the fraction of “false zeros” resulting from the missing data
is likely to be very small. Even in the worst case scenario where all the missing revenue flows would
fall exclusively on country-dyads for which we report zero trade flows, they would only create a small
fraction of “false zeros” because the 7,710 missing revenue flows represent only 2.8% of all zero trade
flows (271,205 trade flows in total). In other words, a maximum of 2.8% of our zero trade flows would
be misreported, instead of reporting small trade flows. This means that our zero trade flows can be
11To get a sense of the quality of Dealogic’s revenue estimates, we contacted Dealogic and inquired about
their estimation method. We learned that Dealogic employs a designated data analytics team, which focuses on
modelling fees earned from investment banking transactions, including equity underwriting. Dealogic develops
pricing models similar to those used by investment banks to price these transactions in the first place. The
parameters of these models are not estimated from data on other transactions, but they are instead derived
from regular expert interviews with industry practitioners responsible for pricing investment banking deals. We
also inquired about the accuracy of such estimates and were advised that Dealogic’s interviews with industry
practitioners indicate that their estimates are within a 5% margin of error. Further reassurance on the reliability
of the estimates comes from the fact that Dealogic serves as a platform for investment banks to collate their data
on capital market transactions into a single data set that they rely on for market share calculations, ranking
tables, and industry reports.
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most accurately interpreted as a mix of mostly true zeros and some censored observations (at most
2.8% of the true zeros) that are very close to zero. For this reason we maintain that our zero trade
flows are informative and should not be treated as missing data, but as true zeros / right censored
observations. We drop country pairs that do not display any variation in revenue flows (i.e. trade
flows are always zero), as they are not informative for the estimation of the gravity equations. We
obtain a sample of 132 countries that have at least one non-zero revenue flow during the 2000-2015
period (see list of countries in Appendix). This leaves us with a very sparse matrix of trade flows,
containing 7,579 non-zero trade flows out of a total of 278,784 entries. This means that 97.3% of our
trade flows are zeros. However, the PPML estimation method is capable of handling such sparse trade
matrices (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006).
Unlike conventional international trade statistics, our data construction approach allows us to ob-
tain data on both domestic and cross-border revenue flows. Domestic (cross-border) flows are defined
such that the underwriter and client are headquartered in the same country (different countries).
On a revenue weighted basis, 42.8% of our measured flows are cross-border, while the remainder are
domestic. Having consistent data on both domestic and cross-border trade is an advantage for the es-
timation of coefficients on time varying country-specific variables despite the inclusion of country-year
fixed effects. There is systematic evidence of home bias in the provision of investment banking services,
although despite this, the industry is highly internationalized and cross-border deals are very common
(Wójcik, 2011). Wójcik et al. (2018a) document that a fairly steady fraction of approximately 45%
of global investment banking revenue was associated with cross-border deals during 2000 - 2015. This
is comparable to the 42.8% of revenue from cross-border equity deals documented in this study. It is
also noteworthy that the home bias, or lack thereof, varies significantly across countries. For example,
approximately 75-80% of fees were from cross-border flows for EMEA, 20-35% for Asia-Pacific and
20-30% for the Americas (Wójcik et al., 2018a).
Figure 1: Trade flows in equity underwriting services 2000, 2007, and 2015
This figure shows trade flows in equity underwriting services measured in current USD for 2000, 2007
and 2015. Countries are labeled using their ISO 3166 codes and RW stands for “rest of the world”.
Figure 1 above presents flow charts representing the evolving trade flows in equity securities underwrit-
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ing services among the leading exporters and importers. The United States are the leading exporter
of equity securities underwriting services with an estimated $3,476m of exports in 2000, followed by
$2,427m for Switzerland, $753m for Germany, $709m for the United Kingdom and $265m for Canada.
This ordering of the top exporting countries has remained remarkably stable over the 2000-2015 period,
with only occasional reshuffling of ranks within this group. In 2007, US exports of equity underwrit-
ting services totalled $4,808m, followed by $3,006 for Switzerland, $1,272m for the United Kingdom,
$1.229m for Germany, and $467m for Canada, closely mirroring the top of the ranking table in 2000.
Finally, despite lower levels of fees earned, these five countries retained their dominant position as
the leading exporters of equity securities underwriting services in 2015 with $3,037m in exports for
the US, $1,494m for Switzerland, $881m for the United Kingdom, $812m for Germany and $440m for
Canada.
In contrast to the very stable ordering of the leading exporters of equity securities underwriting
services, there has been a good degree of change among the leading importers of these services. The
United States have dominated as a leading importer of underwriting services during this period with
imports of $2,537m (2000), $2,514m (2007) and $1,972m (2015) respectively. In 2000, the remainder
of the top 5 importers was dominated by European countries - the United Kingdom ($1,067m), the
Netherlands ($557m), Germany ($540m) and France ($536m). This changed markedly in 2007 with
China rising to the second highest rank with total estimated imports of $1,980m, up from $329m in
2000. Similarly, Brazil ranked as the fourth largest importer of equity securities underwriting services
in 2007 with an estimated $666m of imports, followed by Australia with $607m. Finally, the US and
China retained their dominant positions in 2015 with $1,972m and $947m of imports respectively,
followed by the United Kingdom ($718m), Australia ($386m) and Japan ($377m).
We now zoom in on the country dyads with the highest volume of trade flows. Perhaps unsurprisingly,
all of the top 10 country dyads in 2000 feature the United States either as an exporter or an importer.
Swiss exports of equity underwriting services to the United States in 2000 are the highest recorded
trade flow in that year ($1,520m). This is followed by US exports to the UK ($589m), UK exports
to the US ($406m), US exports to the Netherlands ($374m) and German exports to the US ($287m).
In 2007, exports from Switzerland to the United States ($1,071m) remained the dominant trade flow.
However, trade flows with emerging economies including China and Brazil rose significantly. Specifi-
cally, US exports to China were a close second largest trade flow in 2007, totaling $965m. This was
followed by UK exports to the US ($638m), Swiss exports to China ($534m) and US exports to the
UK ($501m). Exports from the United States to Brazil ($282m) and Switzerland to Brazil ($264m)
ranked 9th and 10th respectively in 2007. Finally, in 2015 Swiss exports to the US retained their
dominance, albeit on a smaller scale ($575m). US exports to the UK came as a close second at $516m,
followed by UK exports to the US ($475m), US exports to China ($378m) and Canadian exports to
the US ($353m). Swiss exports to China ranked 8th in 2015, totaling $211m.
Next, we zoom in on the trading partners (export markets) of the three dominant exporters of se-
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curities underwriting services during our sample period, namely the United States, Switzerland and
the United Kingdom. US exports in 2000 were directed primarily to the UK ($589m - 17%), the
Netherlands ($374m - 11%), France ($287m - 8%), Germany ($259m - 7%) and China ($248m - 7%).
In 2007 there had been a significant reshuffling of US export markets, with China ($965m - 20%)
topping the list, followed by the UK ($501m - 10%), Greece ($355m - 7%), Brazil ($291m - 6%) and
Australia ($264m - 6%). In 2015, US exports to the UK ($516m - 17%) surpassed those to China
($378m - 12%), followed by Japan ($326m - 11%), Spain ($208m - 7%) and Australia ($200m - 7%).
Swiss exports in 2000 were directed primarily to the US ($1,520m - 63%), the UK ($202m - 8%),
Germany ($136m - 6%), France ($98m - 4%) and the Netherlands ($56m - 2%). Similarly as for the
US, Swiss exports in 2007 were in good part rerouted towards emerging markets with China ($534m -
18%) and Brazil ($282m - 9%) in the lead, overshadowed only by the US ($1,071m - 36%) and followed
by those to Australia ($198m - 7%) and the UK ($88m - 3%). Finally, Swiss exports to the US totaled
$575m (38%) in 2015, followed by China ($211m - 14%), Australia ($121m - 8%), the UK ($76m - 5%)
and Spain ($64m - 4%). In 2000, British exports were directed primarily to the US ($406m - 57%),
followed by Germany ($55m - 8%), France ($51m - 7%), Hong Kong ($42m - 6%) and the Netherlands
($27m - 4%). In 2007, we witnessed a shift towards emerging markets similar to that observed for
the US and Switzerland. The dominant US market ($638m) was followed by Russia ($103m), China
($89m), India ($57m) and Australia ($39m). Finally in 2015, British exports were dominated by the
US ($475m - 54%) and China ($65m - 7%), followed by Israel ($45m - 5%), Canada ($40m - 5%) and
France ($26m - 3%).
Finally, we want to emphasize that our data set has several advantages over data sources used in
the existing literature. Unlike data sets on financial services trade that rely on balance of payments
statistics, our data does not require any harmonization, such as mirroring. It is recorded by a single
data vendor, Dealogic, in a consistent manner across countries for every offering of equity securities.
In contrast to other related research, which relies on the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Sur-
vey (CPIS) data, our dependent variable is built using revenue earned from the provision of financial
services, rather than financial holdings. As explained above, this enables us to estimate a gravity
equation, which is consistent with a variety of models of international trade. Unlike CPIS data, the
data used here does not omit transactions from any countries and the data collection process is glob-
ally consistent. In contrast, CPIS excludes some important countries, including China, and relies on
surveys with varying levels of coverage of institutional investors across participating countries. As a
result, the resultant dyadic observations of cross-border financial holdings captured by CPIS data are
not necessarily measured consistently across countries and there are many missing values. By contrast,
due to the comprehensive and consistent nature of the Dealogic ECM database, the zero trade flows in
our data set can be interpreted as “real zeros“ with a very high degree of confidence. Unlike missing
values, they carry useful information about the structure of trade flows among countries.
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3.2 CEPII data set
To control for trade costs, we use the classical explanatory variables used in empirical gravity equations,
sourced from the Centre d’Études Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) GeoDist
distance data set (Mayer and Zignago, 2011). We begin with a bilateral population weighted distance
variable. To account for the physical contiguity of countries, we include an indicator variable that
equals one if countries share a political border and zero otherwise (Shared border). We also control for
whether the trading partners share a language (Shared language) and whether they have a common
colonial history (Shared colonial history). There are several variables available in the CEPII distance
data set that capture the colonial history of countries. We opt for a non-directional specification.
Specifically, Shared colonial history is equal to one for countries that were in a colonial relationship at
any point in history, and is equal to zero otherwise. We do this to reflect the stylized fact that former
colonies are not necessarily only importers, but can also be major exporters of financial services, the
U.S. being the most prominent example.
3.3 Institutional quality and economic development
One of the main variables of interest in our study is the quality of the institutional environment in
the exporting country. The literature on international cross-listing (Doidge, 2004; Doidge et al., 2004,
2007, 2009) suggests a crucial role for institutional factors in affecting where firms choose to list their
shares. Therefore, the quality of the institutional environment in the exporting country acts as a fac-
tor motivating cross-border equity issuance. We use the Worldwide Governance Indicators database,
which offers indices as well as rankings of countries in terms of the quality of their institutions. Kauf-
mann et al. (2011) offer a detailed explanation of the methodology used to aggregate survey data from
government agencies, NGOs, private businesses, and households to derive the indices and rankings in
the database. We select Rule of Law from a set of six governance indicators proposed by Kaufmann
et al. (2011), as it captures institutions that are vital for the financial services industry, such as the
legal environment. Specifically, Rule of Law is designed to measure “the extent to which agents have
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement,
property rights, the police and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” (Kaufmann
et al., 2011, p.4). We use annual country ranks rather than the raw index values, as the relative
positioning of countries in terms of Rule of Law is expected to drive decision making among issuers
(Doidge et al., 2009).
When examining the role of institutional quality, we distinguish between revenue flows for which
the underwriter is headquartered in the same country as the stock exchange on which the offering
is listed and those for which the underwriter is headquartered elsewhere. As explained above, this
distinction enables us to examine the “bonding hypothesis” in the literature on foreign listings (Coffee,
1999). We build a dummy variable equal to one when the country of the exchange is the same as that
of the underwriter (E = U), and zero otherwise. We interact Rule of Law with this dummy to allow
the coefficients to differ across different types of transactions, depending on whether the underwriter
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is located in the same country as the stock exchange and consequently involved in arranging the stock
exchange listing, or located in another country and tasked primarily with marketing shares to local
investors. 59% of trade flows in our data set are associated with underwriters headquartered in the
same country as the stock exchange of the listing.
We also control for the level of economic development in the exporting country, as this is likely
to be highly correlated with Rule of Law. We include normalized GDP per capita (USD) sourced from
the World Bank - World Development Indicators database.12
3.4 Information frictions
3.4.1 Ownership ties
The economic geography literature proposes that trade frictions, such as information frictions, may be
reduced through the strategic business activities of multinational companies, which operate networks
of offices or subsidiaries across multiple countries (Taylor and Derudder, 2016). The expectation is
that the more a country-dyad is connected through the office or subsidiary networks of multinational
companies, the lower the information frictions will be between the two countries, ceteris paribus. To
operationalize this proposition, we obtain data on the parent-subsidiary ties among underwriters from
Dealogic’s ECM database. We identify 26,965 parent-subsidiary ties by identifying unique dyads of
underwriter parents and subsidiaries involved in underwriting of equity issues in the 2000-2015 pe-
riod. We then complement these ties with data on country of headquarters of operations for 6,469 of
subsidiaries (88.3%), which we hand-collected from corporate websites, Bureau van Dijk Orbis, Nexis
UK and Bloomberg. We then discard ties for which we do not have data on country of headquar-
ters of operations available for subsidiaries, leaving us with 25,229 (93.6%) ties. The Dealogic ECM
database, however, continuously updates the parent-subsidiary ties with the most recent ownership
data available. This means that while the records on underwriter subsidiaries for each transaction
are historically accurate, the correspoding parent companies are overwritten with the current, rather
than historical, ownership of said subsidiaries. To allow our connectivity measure to vary over time,
we correct for any changes in these subsidiary-parent ties between 2000 and 2015 using records of
mergers and acquisitions from Dealogic’s M&As database and from Nexis UK. This leads to a data set
of time-varying parent-subsidiary ties recorded annually, which features 25,229 ownership ties among
6,469 underwriter subsidiaries controlled by 3,741 parent companies for the 2000-2015 period. To
create these time-varying parent-subsidiary ties, we corrected the records of parent companies linked
to subsidiaries on an annual basis for 2,256 ties (8.9% of the total).
Using this corrected data, we first construct a count variable based on the number of underwriter
12Alternatively, we control for the development of the informational and communication technology (ICT)
infrastructure of the exporting country by including the fraction of population with access to the internet -
internet users (%) sourced from the World Bank - World Development Indicators database. The results are
robust to using this alternative variable to proxy for economic development.
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parents with subsidiaries located across each country-dyad. Specifically, we construct a count mea-
sure for each country-dyad, which is equal to the number of underwriters for each country-dyad that
have subsidiaries in both countries. We therefore obtain an undirected measure of underwriter over-
laps measured at the level of country-dyads.13 Our data set contains 800 country-dyads (3.2% of all
dyads)14 that are connected by underwriter overlaps in at least one year of the sample period. The
number of overlapping underwriters ranges from 1 to 30 and is time-varying. Finally, we normalize
the count variable by dividing by the sum of ownership ties for each exporter-year (i.e. the number of
ties between the exporting country and the rest of the world). We refer to this variable as Ownership
ties, and it is meant to capture connectivity among countries facilitated by networks of underwriters’
subsidiaries.
3.4.2 Syndication ties
Second, we build measures of multinational connectivity based on ties formed by co-membership of
underwriting syndicates (Pažitka et al., 2019). We refer to them as syndication ties. To operationalise
variables based on syndication ties, we use data on issues of equity securities from Dealogic ECM
database with more than one underwriter (“underwriting syndicates”). Out of the total of 91,511
equity securities issues underwritten in the 2000-2015 period, 39,051 (42.7%) deals involved more than
one underwriter. The number of underwriters per deal varies from 1 to 89 with a mean value of 2.8
for our sample of offerings. We build two different measures of syndication ties. First, syndication ties
count is defined as the number of ties formed by the co-membership of underwriting syndicates among
underwriter parents headquartered in country v with those headquartered in country w in a given
year. Formally, we begin with an underwriter-deal affiliation matrix D, which records the membership
of underwriter parents in underwriting syndicates (deals). We then multiply D by its transpose DT
to arrive at an adjacency matrix U with elements uij, which represent the numbers of syndication ties
among individual underwriters i and j, as shown in the equation below.
U = D(DT );uij = 0 if i = j
We then sum the number of syndication ties among individual underwriters for country dyads vw
as shown in the equation below, to arrive at an adjacency matrix C with elements cvw, representing




Second, we build a measure called unique syndication ties count. It is defined as a group degree
13For example, if say JPMorgan (parent) has subsidiaries in both the US and the UK, that counts as one
ownership tie, regardless of how many subsidiaries JPMorgan has in each country. If for example JPMorgan,
Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs have some subsidiaries in the US and the UK, regardless of their number,
this would be three ownership ties between the US and the UK. Every parent company counts only once at
most.
14Given that our specification of ownership ties is undirected, we only count each country-dyad once here.
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centrality measure (Everett and Borgatti, 1999). For each exporter-importer-year observation, we
identify the number of unique syndication partners that underwriters in the exporting country have
in the importing country in that year. This means that each underwriter in the importing country
is counted only once, even if multiple underwriters in the exporting country had co-syndicated with
that underwriter. This specification is therefore directed from exporting to importing country and is
not necessarily symmetric for country dyads.
Finally, we transform the counts and unique counts into percentages by normalizing them by their
respective sums for each exporter-year. This normalization is necessary as larger exporters have more
ties, and therefore the raw count measures are not informative about the intensity of the relation-
ships. The final measures (Syndication ties and Unique syndication ties) reflect the relative intensity
of syndication ties between the exporting and importing countries.
4 Empirical gravity equations
4.1 Institutional quality
4.1.1 Baseline results
In this section, we explore the impact of institutional quality in the exporting country, as proxied
by Rule of Law, on trade in equity securities underwriting services. In addition to all the control
variables that are standard in the gravity framework, we also control for the level of development in
the exporting country, proxied by normalized GDP per capita, as development is likely to be highly
correlated with Rule of Law. The empirical model is given in Equation (6):
Xjkt = exp {β ln(Distjk) +AjktΓ + πjt + pkt}+ εjkt (6)
where Xjkt are bilateral trade flows from country j to country k, ln(Distjk) is the logarithm of phys-
ical distance between the trading partners, πjt are exporter-time fixed effects, pkt are importer-time
fixed effects, and Ajkt is a vector of control variables, including normalized GDP per capita in the
exporting country, the Rule of Law rank of the exporting country, a shared border, a shared language,
and a shared colonial history. All the explanatory variables are interacted with an international trade
dummy. The coefficients are therefore to be interpreted as the impact of the relevant variables on
international trade relative to domestic trade.
In addition, we separately examine the extensive and intensive margins of trade. When considering the
extensive margin, we replace trade flows Xjkt with an indicator variable Extenjkt = 1[Xjkt > 0]. It is
equal to one, when a dyad reports positive trade flows and zero otherwise. For the intensive margin,
we estimate Equation (6) on the sub-sample of non-zero trade flows, i.e. Xjkt where Extenjkt = 1. In
all regressions standard errors are clustered at the exporter level. The estimated coefficients from all
three specifications are given in Table (1).
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A significantly negative coefficient on the Rule of Law rank (with a smaller number indicating higher
institutional quality) indicates that Rule of Law has a significantly positive effect on international
trade relative to domestic trade. According to the coefficient of -0.972 in column (1), moving down
one rank (indicating a deterioration in institutional quality) is associated with a decrease in interna-
tional trade relative to domestic trade by 62.2%. These results are in line with the economic geography
literature. For example, Wójcik et al. (2018b) find that international financial centers (IFCs) emerge
from well-developed cities in countries with strong Rule of Law and cost efficient contract enforcement.
Rule of Law matters along both the extensive and intensive margins of trade, even after controlling
for the level of development in the exporting country. However, the effect is slightly stronger along
the intensive margin. The effect on the extensive margin of trade is -36.1% (column (2)) and the
effect on the intensive margin is -51.8% (column (3)). As expected, the normalized GDP per capita of
the exporting country is also highly positively significant, but only at the extensive margin, reflecting
that international financial centers (IFCs) tend to emerge in already well-developed economies. A
coefficient of 0.999 in column (2) indicates that a one standard deviation increase in GDP per capita
is associated with an increase in the probability of international trade relative to domestic trade by
171.6%.




Norm GDP per capita 1.210*** 0.999*** 0.478*
(0.392) (0.304) (0.267)
Rule of Law rank -0.972*** -0.448*** -0.729***
(0.102) (0.0692) (0.0716)
Log distance -0.150 -0.458*** -0.0853
(0.153) (0.0856) (0.123)
Shared language 0.155 0.524*** 0.105
(0.383) (0.167) (0.360)
Shared border 0.138 0.0563 0.0231
(0.434) (0.118) (0.354)
Shared colonial history 1.085*** 0.419*** 0.801***
(0.230) (0.108) (0.219)
Observations 73,612 73,612 7,369
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01
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There are clear reasons why the institutional framework of the exporting country matters for firms
issuing equity securities. Firms that list their shares abroad take advantage of good institutional
frameworks to increase their valuations. Coffee (1999) suggests that foreign firms from jurisdictions
with relatively weaker investor protection can increase their valuation by “bonding” themselves to
superior institutions through cross-listing (“bonding hypothesis”). Cross-listing firms subject them-
selves to stricter standards of regulation, disclosure, and enforcement to signal their commitment to
respecting the rights of shareholders. The added protection and the reputational effects make investors
more willing to buy the shares of foreign firms that “tie their hands” in this manner (Siegel, 2005).
Cross-listing firms are thereby able to achieve a higher market valuation. Reese and Weisbach (2002),
Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004), and Doidge (2004) find support for this bonding hypothesis. It is
also consistent with the analysis by Doidge et al. (2007) who suggest that country-level protection of
investors is crucial to firms that aspire to improve their corporate governance. The authors find that
access to global capital markets sharpens the incentives of firms in less-developed countries to achieve
better governance.
Turning to distance, we find that the latter only matters at the extensive margin. A coefficient of
-0.458 in column (2) implies that a 10% increase in bilateral distance translates into a 4.58% decrease
in the probability of international trade relative to domestic trade. The coefficients in the overall
sample and on the intensive margin are insignificant, indicating that once countries have entered a
trade relationship, distance no longer matters. These results are noteworthy for several reasons. First,
we find that distance does not matter for volumes of trade. It is not surprising given the non-physical
nature of trade in financial services. This is in sharp contrast to the goods trade literature where the
distance elasticity varies between -0.9 and -1.1 (Head and Mayer, 2014). More importantly, it is also
in contrast with the literature on international finance, where many authors find elasticities close to
those for goods trade (e.g. Portes and Rey, 2005, for equities). This is potentially due to the fact
that we use PPML, properly account for multilateral resistance with exporter-time and importer-time
fixed effects, and account for institutional quality, which appears to be a major determinant of trade
in financial services. Nevertheless, it might appear puzzling that physical distance still matters at
the extensive margin. The consensus in the literature on gravity in international finance is that this
reflects information fictions. In Section 4.2, we augment our estimation model to account for infor-
mation frictions, and indeed find that our estimate of the distance elasticity at the extensive margin
decreases further.
We now turn to the bilateral time-invariant variables, namely a shared language, a shared border
and a shared colonial history, which are traditionally considered in gravity equations. A shared bor-
der does not attract any significance. This result is in contrast to the goods trade literature where a
shared border is usually highly significant, with an average coefficient of 0.7 (Head and Mayer, 2014).
A shared language has a significantly positive effect on the extensive margin of trade. In other words,
two countries that share a common language are more likely to trade with each other. Having the
same language implies that countries are 68.9% more likely to trade at all. This appears to provide
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evidence that communication costs are large in this setting. Our coefficient of 0.524 is higher than the
average coefficient (for volume) of 0.4 in the goods trade literature (Head and Mayer, 2014). Finally,
a shared colonial past has a significantly positive impact at both margins, especially the intensive
one. A coefficient of 1.085 in column (1) indicates that being a previous colonial partner increases
international trade relative to domestic trade by 195.9%. This coefficient is higher than magnitudes
previously found in the goods trade literature (0.75) (Head and Mayer, 2014). The apparent impor-
tance of a shared colonial history is intuitive. Countries that have been in a colonial relationship are
more likely to share common institutional and legal frameworks, which are paramount for trade in
financial services.
4.1.2 Controlling for services free trade agreements
Our baseline results of Table (1) do not account for free trade agreements in services (SFTAs). Few
free trade agreements cover financial services, and specific national and regional regulations are still
strong impediments to trade. However, we check the robustness of our results to the inclusion of
SFTAs and examine whether those have any effect at all.15 Because of endogeneity concerns, we
instrument for SFTAs with the dummy for whether trading partners share a common border. We
follow a two-step control function approach. First, we run PPML on:
SFTAjkt = exp {β ln(Distjk) +AjktΓ + πjt + pkt}+ εjkt (7)
where SFTAjkt is a dummy variable equal to one when countries j and k are in a SFTA in year t,
and zero otherwise. We use PPML in the first stage to overcome the problems prevalent with other
estimation strategies discussed in Section 2. However, our dependent variable is now a dummy, rather
than continuous. Therefore, we actually estimate a log-linear probability model. This is superior to a
linear probability model in this case because the fitted values lie mainly between zero and one. The
main motivation for using PPML rather than more traditional binary variable models, such as Probit
or Logit, lies in the computational difficulties of estimating the latter with a large number of fixed
effects. Due to the non-linear nature of our modeling procedure, we take a control function approach
whereby the estimated residuals from the first stage, ε̂jkt, are introduced as a control variable in the
second stage (response residual) to overcome endogeneity concerns. The first stage is strong with a
z-statistic on a shared border of -3.88.
Second, we run PPML on:
Xjkt = exp
{
γCF ε̂jkt + γSFTAjkt + β ln(Distjk) + ÃjktΓ + πjt + pkt
}
+ ujkt (8)
where Ãjkt is the same vector of control variables as Ajkt without our instrumental variable (shared
border) and ε̂jkt is the response residual from the first stage. The results from the second-stage re-
gressions are in Table (2).
15The list of SFTAs is included in Appendix Section B.
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Our results of Table (1) are robust to the inclusion of SFTAs. The distance elasticity decreases
further to -0.379 at the extensive margin. Interestingly, SFTAs themselves appear to matter at the
extensive margin of trade. A coefficient of 0.430 in column (2) indicates that countries that share an
SFTA are 53.7% more likely to trade in equities underwriting services. While a lot of SFTAs do not
explicitly cover financial services, countries that enter into such agreements might be more likely to
lower their bilateral barriers to trade in financial services.




Norm GDP per capita 1.156*** 0.949*** 0.437*
(0.310) (0.247) (0.244)
Rule of Law rank -0.900*** -0.397*** -0.696***
(0.0730) (0.0417) (0.0662)
Log distance -0.121 -0.379*** -0.0624
(0.105) (0.0463) (0.0997)
Shared language 0.139 0.508*** 0.0786
(0.241) (0.0919) (0.212)
Shared colonial history 1.243*** 0.537*** 0.901***
(0.246) (0.110) (0.241)
SFTA 0.473* 0.430*** 0.239
(0.242) (0.0943) (0.247)
Response residual -0.267* -0.221*** -0.147
(0.152) (0.0535) (0.168)
Constant 20.44*** -0.257 20.75***
(0.251) (0.254) (0.229)
Observations 71,213 71,213 6,541
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
4.1.3 The Bonding Hypothesis
To provide further support to the relevance of institutional quality, we exploit differences in the
sensitivity of certain transaction types to the latter. This strategy has been used among others in
Portes et al. (2001), Daude and Fratzscher (2008), and Brei and von Peter (2017) who compare
different types of assets (e.g. equities, bonds, and loans). The nature of our data set enables us to
22
contrast different types of transactions within the same asset category, namely equity securities. Our
strategy relies on the fact that equity underwriting services are provided by syndicates of underwriters,
not all of which will be geographically located in the country of the stock exchange where the shares
are listed. Underwriters located in the country of the stock exchange typically help with the listing
itself. By contrast, underwriters located in other countries are typically used to help sell shares in the
offering to local institutional investors (Pollock et al., 2004). According to the “bonding hypothesis”,
firms signal their commitment to investor protection by listing their shares in a jurisdiction with
superior institutional quality (Doidge et al., 2007, 2009). Hence the latter should matter more for
listing transactions, i.e. transactions where the underwriter is located in the country of the stock
exchange where the shares are issued. We interact Rule of Law with a dummy variable E = U equal
to one when the country of the underwriter is the same as the country of the stock exchange where
the shares are listed. Structural gravity is separable in industries and so conceptualising E = U and
E 6= U as two separate industries denoted by m, we estimate the theoretically consistent gravity
equation as follows:
Xjktm = exp {β ln(Distjk) +AjktmΓ + πjtm + pktm}+ εjktm (9)
The results are in Table (3).
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Norm GDP per capita 2.739*** 0.842*** 2.371***
(0.484) (0.242) (0.431)
Rule of Law rank -0.135 -0.160*** -0.102
(0.0872) (0.0550) (0.0757)
Rule of Law rank, -2.519*** -0.930*** -1.875***
× E=U (0.319) (0.0715) (0.221)
Shared language 0.154 0.711*** 0.0701
(0.264) (0.179) (0.267)
Shared border 0.260 -0.0751 0.196
(0.342) (0.111) (0.290)
Shared colonial history 0.716*** 0.464*** 0.567***
(0.201) (0.0973) (0.207)
Log distance -0.229 -0.482*** -0.116
(0.173) (0.0867) (0.136)
Observations 104,422 104,422 8,531
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The standalone Rule of Law variable loses most of its significance, except at the extensive margin.
According to the coefficient of -0.16 in column (2), moving down one rank (indicating a deterioration
in institutional quality) is associated with a decrease in the probability of international trade relative
to domestic trade by 14.8%. By contrast, the interaction term between Rule of Law and the dummy
variable E = U is significant at both margins. This result indicates that Rule of Law is an important
determinant of where firms choose to list their shares, and matters less when firms simply market their
shares to local investors. A coefficient of -2.519 in column (1) indicates that moving up one rank is
associated with a decrease in international trade relative to domestic trade by 91.9% for transactions
where the underwriter is located in the country where the shares are listed.
4.2 Information barriers
We now turn to the role of information barriers, as proxied by our various connectivity measures. We
augment the specification of Equation (6) with the variables Zjkt, denoting our measure of ownership
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ties and our two measures of syndication ties. We include them separately in the specification of
Equation (6), but also together to examine whether one connectivity dimension matters more than
the others. The estimating equation becomes:
Xjkt = exp {β ln(Distjk) +XjktΓ + Zjktψ + πjt + pkt}+ εjkt (10)
The results are in Table (5). All three connectivity measures have a significantly positive impact on
international trade relative to domestic trade. A coefficient of 0.103 on ownership ties in column (1)
suggests that a one percentage point increase in ownership ties is associated with a 10.8% increase
in bilateral trade. This result is in line with the economic geography literature which proposes that
trade frictions (such as information frictions) may be reduced through the strategic business activities
of multinational companies, which operate networks of offices or subsidiaries across multiple countries
(Taylor and Derudder, 2016). The results on syndication ties however suggest that physical presence
is not necessary to break down information barriers. Indeed, columns (2) and (3) show that a one
percentage point increase in syndication ties (unique syndication ties) is associated with a 6.5% (9.4%)
increase in international trade relative to domestic trade.
The coefficient on Rule of Law decreases noticeably in magnitude when we include the connectivity
variables based on syndication ties. Moving down one rank (indicating a deterioration in institutional
quality) is associated with a decrease in international trade relative to domestic trade by 32.2% in
column (2) and 42.8% in column (3) - compared to 62.2% in Table (1). In addition, the coefficient
on a shared colonial history also decreases substantially in magnitude compared to Table (1). This is
the case when we include both ownership ties and syndication ties. The coefficients imply that being
a previous colonial partner increases international trade relative to domestic trade by 79.3% (column
(1)), 78.6% (column (2)), and 151.9% (column (3)) - compared to 195.9% in Table (1). The fact that
Rule of Law and a shared colonial history matter less once we account for ownership and syndication
ties could indicate that (physical or relational) networks might help overcome issues associated with
weaker, or different, institutional frameworks. In column (4), we report the results when we include
all three connectivity measures in the model. All three connectivity measures remain significant.
The impact of ownership ties is much larger in magnitude, suggesting that the physical presence of
subsidiaries in the importing country has some value added beyond syndication connections.
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Table 5: PPML gravity estimates: Information barriers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Syndication ties 0.0632*** 0.0451***
(0.00442) (0.00428)
Unique syndication 0.0895*** 0.0545***
ties (0.0140) (0.0113)
Ownership ties 0.103*** 0.0925***
(0.0197) (0.0133)
Norm GDP per capita 0.821** 0.961*** 0.483 0.379
(0.387) (0.287) (0.337) (0.257)
Rule of Law rank -0.993*** -0.388*** -0.559*** -0.354***
(0.0906) (0.0882) (0.0910) (0.0784)
Log distance -0.252* 0.101 -0.108 -0.0502
(0.146) (0.133) (0.128) (0.108)
Shared language -0.506 0.358 0.395 -0.164
(0.314) (0.272) (0.396) (0.209)
Shared border 0.0571 0.489 -0.484 0.0914
(0.308) (0.407) (0.323) (0.201)
Shared colonial history 0.584*** 0.580*** 0.924*** 0.155
(0.155) (0.176) (0.270) (0.184)
Observations 73,612 73,612 73,612 73,612
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Next, we look at the impact of our connectivity measures on the extensive and intensive margins of










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Ownership ties appear to matter only at the intensive margin of trade, while the connectivity mea-
sures based on syndication ties matter for both the extensive and intensive margins of trade. It is not
surprising that networks of subsidiaries matter only at the intensive margin, as such networks build
up over time and potentially as the result of trade. By contrast, syndication ties can be build quickly
and without the need for physical infrastructure. While a shared colonial history continues to matter
both at the intensive and extensive margins when we include ownership or syndication ties, the Rule
of Law now appears to matter primarily at the intensive margin. In Appendix Table (2), we show
that these results on information barriers are robust to controlling for SFTAs (instrumented as before).
Another interesting finding in Table (6) is that our estimate of the distance elasticity for the exten-
sive margin decreases further compared to Table (1) when we include the syndication ties variables.
The coefficient decreases from -0.458 in Table (1) column (2) to -0.386 in column (5) and -0.376 in
column (6) in Table (6). These coefficients imply that a 10% increase in bilateral distance translates
into a 3.86% and 3.76% decrease in the probability of bilateral trade, respectively. This supports the
conjecture of the previous literature on international finance that the continued relevance of distance
is indicative of information barriers, rather than a real effect of physical distance. As an illustration
of the power of institutional quality and information barriers to account for the continued relevance
of distance, we replicate Table (1) without Rule of Law. In other words, the model does not control
for institutional quality or information barriers at all. The results are in Appendix Table (3). The
coefficients on distance are now significantly negative and large along both the intensive and exten-
sive margins of trade. They stand at -1.134 in the overall sample, -0.760 on the extensive margin,
and -0.959 on the intensive margin - reaching magnitudes closer to those found previously in the
literature.16 Our finding of a small distance elasticity on the extensive margin when we control for
institutions and information frictions is likely due to the fact that our variables do not capture all
the factors that matter for trade in equity securities underwriting services, particularly restrictions
on the listing of foreign shares and foreign asset holdings. Comparative international data on these
regulations is unfortunately very scarce.
5 Conclusions
We shed some new light on the determinants of international trade in financial services using the grav-
ity framework. The interest in gravity in international finance is not new, but the literature suffers
from several shortcomings that we try to address. We build a novel panel data set that has several
advantages over other data sets based on balance of payments statistics. We proceed “bottom up” by
aggregating transaction-level data on domestic and cross-border equity securities underwriting trans-
actions from the Dealogic Equity Capital Market (ECM) database. Having access to transaction-level
data enables us to aggregate the data in a flexible manner (e.g. to look at different types of transac-
16Interestingly, a shared border receives a negative coefficient in this simple gravity model without institutional
and information variables. This is probably driven by the fact that international financial centres (IFCs) are
quite distant from each other.
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tions) and to build innovative measures of connectivity between trading partners to explore the role of
information barriers. In addition, we observe both domestic and cross-border transactions, which en-
ables us to estimate theory-consistent gravity equations. This represents a departure from the existing
literature on gravity in international finance, where most contributions fail to apply theory-consistent
methods. In addition to accounting properly for multilateral resistance with country-time fixed effects,
we apply state-of-the-art econometric methods (PPML).
Our novel data set and methods combined allow us to shed light on the role of information barriers
and institutional quality in determining trade patterns in financial services. We find that institutional
quality of the exporting country (proxied by Rule of Law) has a significantly positive impact on in-
ternational trade relative to domestic trade. Thanks to the disaggregated nature of our data set, we
explore whether institutional quality matters relatively more for certain types of transactions. We
find evidence in support of the “bonding hypothesis” in the literature on the determinants of foreign
listings (Coffee, 1999; Doidge, 2004; Doidge et al., 2004, 2007, 2009). To capture information bar-
riers, we borrow concepts from the economic geography literature and build three novel measures of
connectivity based on banks’ parent-subsidiary networks and syndication ties across trading partners
(Taylor and Derudder, 2016; Pažitka and Wójcik, 2019; Pažitka et al., 2019). To the best of our
knowledge, our paper is the first to examine the impact of business networks on trade in financial
services in a gravity framework. We find that better connections significantly encourage international
trade relative to domestic trade.
A stable finding of the literature on gravity in international finance is that distance matters. This is
surprising since there are no transportation costs involved. The consensus is that distance is a proxy
for informational and institutional frictions. Interestingly, we find a very limited role for physical
distance on the extensive margin of trade. This result is in contrast with the previous literature and
is driven both by our methods and the inclusion of relevant institutional and informational variables.
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Appendix
A Countries included in the sample
The countries included in the sample are Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Bermuda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil,
British Virgin Islands, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Cayman Islands, Central African Republic, Chile,
China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Faeroe Islands, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana,
Greece, Hong Kong, China, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica,
Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, South Korea, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Macao SAR, China, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico,
Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Northern Mariana Is-
lands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Puerto
Rico, Qatar, Reunion, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore,
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, Sweden, Switzerland,
Syrian Arab Republic, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey,
Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Vietnam, Zam-
bia, and Zimbabwe.
B Services free trade agreements
To control for free trade agreements in services (SFTAs), we build a time-varying dyadic indicator
variable which is equal to one if both trading partners are members of a free trade agreement that covers
services, and zero otherwise. We use data from the World Trade Organization (WTO) Regional Trade
Agreements database summarized in Table (1) below. This database covers 311 FTA notifications,
which document countries joining FTAs, including bilateral FTAs and multilateral trading blocks. We
exclude 153 notifications that do not cover trade in services and 16 notifications associated with FTAs
that came into force after the end of 2015, leaving us with 158 notifications. Our final data set covers
17 multilateral trading blocks, 44 instances of outside agreements between individual countries and
multilateral trading blocks, and 94 bilateral FTAs. We identify the signatories of each FTA, and the
year in which the agreement came into force for each signatory, to build our indicator variable.
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Table 1: Services Free Trade Agreements




Australia, Brunei, India, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, South
Korea, Vietnam, Thailand, Leo PDR, Cambodia , Indonesia
CAFTA-DR
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, United
States of America
CARICOM 2002
Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti,
Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago
Dominican
Republic - Central America
2001 Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua
EAC 2012 Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania
EAEU 2014-2015 Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Russian Federation
EEA 1994






EFTA 2002 Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland
El Salvador - Honduras -
Taiwan
2008 El Salvador, Honduras, Taiwan
EU 1958-2013
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom
GUAM 2003 Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Republic of, Ukraine
GCC - Singapore 2013 Singapore, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates
Colombia - Northern Triangle 2009 Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras
Mercosur 2005 Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay
Mexico - Central America 2012 Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua
NAFTA 1994 Canada, Mexico, United States of America
Trans-Pacific
Strategic Economic Partnership
Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, Singapore
EFTA’s outside agreements: Costa Rica (2014), Panama (2014), Hong Kong (2012), Ukraine (2012), Colombia (2011), South Korea (2006), Chile
(2004), Singapore (2003), Mexico (2001).
EU’s outside agreements: Bosnia and Herzegovina (2015), Georgia (2014), Moldova (2014), Ukraine (2014), Serbia (2013), Costa Rica (2013), El
Salvador (2013), Guatemala (2013), Honduras (2013), Nicaragua (2013), Panama (2013), Colombia (2013), Peru (2013), Ecuador (2013), South Korea (2011),
Montenegro (2010), Albania (2009), Antigua and Barbuda (2008), Bahamas (2008), Barbados (2008), Belize (2008), Dominica (2008), Dominican Republic
(2008), Grenada (2008), Guyana (2008), Jamaica (2008), Saint Kitts and Nevis (2008), Saint Lucia (2008), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (2008), Suriname
(2008), Trinidad and Tobago (2008), Chile (2005), North Macedonia (2004), Mexico (2000).
Bilateral agreements: Australia - China (2015), China - South Korea (2015), South Korea - New Zealand (2015), South Korea - Vietnam (2015),
Chile - Thailand (2015), Mexico - Panama (2015), Japan - Australia (2015), Canada - South Korea (2015), South Korea - Australia (2014), Hong Kong -
Chile (2014), Canada - Honduras (2014), Iceland - China (2014), Switzerland - China (2014), Singapore - Taiwan (2014), New Zealand - Taiwan (2013), Costa
Rica - Singapore (2013), Costa Rica - Peru (2013), Canada - Panama (2013), Malaysia - Australia (2013), Ukraine - Montenegro (2013), United States -
Panama (2013), Chile - Nicaragua (2012), United States - Colombia (2012), Panama - Peru (2012), South Korea - United States (2012), Japan - Peru
(2012), Peru - Mexico (2012), Canada - Colombia (2011), China - Costa Rica (2011), India - Japan (2011), Peru - South Korea (2011), India - Malaysia
(2011), Hong Kong - New Zealand (2011), Chile-China (2010), New Zealand - Malaysia (2010), Chile - Guatemala (2010), Peru - China (2010), India - South
Korea (2010), Pakistan - China (2009), Nicaragua - Panama (2009), Japan - Vietnam (2009), Japan - Switzerland (2009), Canada - Peru (2009), Peru -
Singapore (2009), Guatemala - Panama (2009), Chile - Colombia (2009), Australia - Chile (2009), Chile - Peru (2009), Peru - United States (2009),
Honduras - Panama (2009), China - Singapore (2009), Oman - United States (2009), Japan - Philippines (2008), Costa Rica - Panama (2008), China - New
Zealand (2008), Brunei - Japan (2008), Chile - Honduras (2008), Indonesia - Japan (2008), Chile - Panama (2008), Taiwan - Nicaragua (2008), Malaysia -
Pakistan (2008), Japan - Thailand (2007), Chile - Japan (2007), Faeroe Islands - Iceland (2006), Bahrain - United States (2006), Panama - Singapore (2006),
Japan - Malaysia (2006), Taiwan - Guatemala (2006), South Korea - Singapore (2006), Morocco - United States (2006), Jordan - Singapore (2005), India -
Singapore (2005), New Zealand - Thailand (2005), Japan - Mexico (2005), Australia - Thailand (2005), Australia - United States (2005), Mexico -
Uruguay (2004), Chile - South Korea (2004), Chinese Taipei - Panama (2004), Chile - United States (2004), Singapore - United States (2004), China - Macao
(2003), Australia - Singapore (2003), China - Hong Kong (2003), El Salvador - Panama (2003), Japan - Singapore (2002), Chile - El Salvador (2002), Chile -
Costa Rica (2002), Jordan - United States (2001), New Zealand - Singapore (2001), Chile - Mexico (1999), Canada - Chile (1997), Colombia - Mexico (1995),
Australia - New Zealand (1989).
C Supplementary tables - Section 4
The two tables below are supplementary tables for Section 4. Table (2) replicates Table (6) in the
text but controls for SFTAs, instrumented with a shared border as described in the text. Table (3)










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Log distance -1.134*** -0.760*** -0.959***
(0.221) (0.111) (0.164)
Shared language 0.142 0.364** -0.0349
(0.389) (0.142) (0.378)
Shared border -1.585*** -0.373*** -1.506***
(0.283) (0.0963) (0.278)
Shared colonial history 0.979*** 0.473*** 0.791***
(0.297) (0.121) (0.304)
Observations 76,766 76,766 74,89
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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